The great drone debate

Reading ever-changing geopolitical winds is key to assessing and planning intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) priorities. Western militaries currently hold superior conventional capabilities over China, Russia and other major regional powers, which reduces the chances of a conventional war. This brings more unorthodox tactics – such as using large fishing fleets to apply territorial pressure or initiating information campaigns to occupy resources and wear down foes – into play to achieve national security objectives. The use of remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) also falls into this paradigm. Drones afford militaries the ability to project force and survey an opponent without putting human pilots at risk. In a situation where war remains undeclared, the use of drones in reconnaissance also can help limit the potential for an armed confrontation to escalate into a wider conflict – after all, an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that gets shot down in the line of duty is a far smaller loss than the death of a pilot. This makes the US military’s decision to install new reconnaissance equipment on the ageing Lockheed Martin U-2 aircraft – a project completed in February 2020 – and the potential mothballing of the RQ-40 Global Hawk remotely piloted aircraft (RPA) all the more intriguing.

According to Mike Fowler, an associate professor of military and strategic studies at the US Air Force Academy, these moves are symptomatic of the Department of Defense’s lingering association with the counterinsurgency operations of yesteryear – a world it wants to leave behind as it focuses on the conventional threats posed by China, Russia and Iran. “Pentagon budget officials seem stuck in a battle between irregular warfare and conventional warfare – this is a false dichotomy,” he says. “Russia, China and Iran are conventional adversaries, but they continue to confront the US and its partners using unconventional methods.”

Old dogs, new tricks

RPAs cover a wide scope, from small off-the-shelf drones to the RQ-140 Global Hawk with its 737-sized wingspan and the futuristic RQ-170. RPAs and manned spy aircraft are already working with existing military hardware, including satellites and other technologies, to create cohesive surveillance ‘ecosystems’. “With good battle space management, conventional aircraft, military drones and satellites not only co-exist but are actually needed to operate in an integrated way to provide an overall intelligence picture,” says Professor Peter Lee, director of security and risk research and innovation at the University of Portsmouth. “Focused ISR capability, wider-view ISR capability and then the satellites above give different layers of intelligence from the very broad to the highly focused.”

Even so, when compared with manned aircraft, RPAs offer a number of crucial advantages. Firstly, they are attractive as roving eyes because the technology does not put pilots at risk. “They have longer loiter times for larger models, they can be handheld – which provides tactical flexibility – and they can be low-observable. And it’s just money; no lives are at risk,” says Fowler. “On the down side, the lightweight nature of current RPAs means they have limited firepower and limited all-weather capability as ISR tools.”

Lee agrees, adding that many existing surveillance platforms are relatively slow and defenceless, making them easy to shoot down in contested environments. As an example, he cites the US and the UK operating the MQ-9 ‘Reaper’ drone in Syria, and suggests that without tacit approval to fly in Syrian airspace, these aircraft would be easy targets for Russian anti-aircraft technology. There are also risks in terms of the available technology, with RPAs susceptible to jamming and electronic warfare, leading to aborted missions or the failure to provide warnings of imminent attacks.

These issues are a consequence of warfare moving into a new sphere. “Land, sea and air are the traditional domains of war. The US has now also designated the electromagnetic spectrum as a domain of future war,” says Lee. “I think we are at the stage now where the electromagnetic spectrum is an area of competition or rivalry. For example, can you block an enemy’s signal? Can you spoof the signal? Can you make your enemy’s GPS think that the ship is somewhere it shouldn’t be?

“For me, all the discussion about combining conventional aircraft, military drones and satellites into comprehensive ISR delivery almost becomes a secondary consideration if you have an enemy that will just completely disrupt the electromagnetic spectrum.”

Regardless, defence planning is as much about politics and money as it is about strategy, according to Fowler. “For the US military, the ability to move money from one programme to another is limited and requires congressional approval, and congressional interest in military programmes can be driven more by jobs than by strategic necessity,” he says. “But budget battles are not simply about choosing between a U-2 and an RQ-170 – the ‘great power versus insurgency’ competition expands across the services.” He cites former US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who in his memoir talks about the constant struggle to balance equipment for future unconventional wars against planning for conventional conflicts.

“For the air force, this translated into budget tensions between RPAs and the F-35,” explains Fowler. “The current family of remotely-piloted aircraft is primarily designed for irregular warfare missions in which the air defence threat is negligible. Most RPAs cannot survive an anti-access, area denial (A2AD) environment made of advanced surface-to-air missiles.

“The one exception is the RQ-170 low-observable RPA. However, even the advanced RQ-170 appears to be susceptible to electronic warfare, such as in the case of Iran forcing down an RQ-170. This might, in part, explain the funding tensions between the manned U-2 and its intended replacement, the RQ-4 Global Hawk.”

Look to the future

The deployment of surveillance assets in the future could centre on alternative and diverse methods of collecting information. A report by the US Centre for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment, for example, considered the concept of ‘deterrence by detection’, whereby surveillance is visible and out in the open. The report argues the US could deploy the strategy using existing non-stealth assets. “Deterrence by detection is a fine concept and could be accomplished with a multitude of ISR capabilities,” says Fowler. “The need for RPAs primarily revolves around the time sensitivity of trying to avoid a conventional fait accompli move. For permanent surveillance of a set area, land and sea-based systems are more efficient for a fixed, persistent collection. If looking for wide-area surveillance without the need to track individual targets, a system of stationary sensors that includes passive sonar, ship-surveillance radars and aerostat-based ISR, complemented with space ISR, is preferred.”

While trends are fluid, there are roles for both large and small UAVs. In theory, UAVs could replace every manned aircraft mission, says Fowler. “Smaller UAVs provide their own stealth. The ideal is something like the cockroach or a fly from the movie Eye in the Sky. This would be optimal for tracking individual terrorists or sneaking into enemy meetings.” On the other hand, larger UAVs could be weaponised – such as the bomb truck or a missile truck UAV. “Similar to this is the ‘loyal wingman’ concept – the UAV carries extra ordnance that is ‘slaved’ to the manned fighter or to any other decision-making node.”

Add artificial intelligence (AI) to the equation and boundaries of surveillance are again pushed back. Drone technology for swarm tactics is already here, with groups of small drones synchronised to fly in tight urban airspaces already in operation. AI-based drones could be used for battlefield ISR, with large numbers of small, inexpensive drones tracking enemy forces. “An ISR drone cloud could adjust its shape, coverage and sensor types in line with enemy actions,” says Fowler, “with AI scheduling refuelling or drone replacement to minimise gaps in coverage.”

Fowler says AI could also be used for tracking and identifying terrorists, as well as for detecting deception and disguises. With AI, it’s possible to pinpoint height, weight and eye colour, as well as clothing, accessories or even a cigarette brand used by a target. It is inevitable that AI will play a greater role in all aspects of air power and other surveillance operations, agrees Lee. “In surveillance terms, AI could play a role if there are particular objects that you are looking for,” he says. “AI could filter information in or information out for the human to look at.” However, areas such as image interpretation need further development before they can be fully exploited.

Away from surveillance, unmanned AI-based attack drones could be used against moving targets such as a wave of ballistic missiles or a fleet of ships. This leads to a broader discussion about AI and whether UAVs could function without a direct human control signal – a scenario that could circumnavigate issues with electromagnetic jamming. “I do not think that is ethically or legally problematic when it comes to surveillance operations,” says Lee. “Where the real controversy lies is about lethal operations where a drone is used to kill. And the big legal and ethical limitation in the UK and the West generally is in not allowing a machine to decide to kill a human being.”

It’s here that the ethics of war come into play. Just as the technology used in surveillance is shifting, so too are the red lines moderating them. And in the world of unconventional warfare, those lines can blur. National cultures, legal parameters and ethical expectations combine to determine how surveillance systems and weapons are used. Lee says there are noticeable differences between Russia, China and Nato states in terms of the ethics of not just war, but also acts of surveillance and advanced technology use.

“In the UK and Europe, we place a very high value on human rights and we are subject to the European Convention on Human Rights. China and Russia do not share the same approach to human rights,” he says, citing China’s surveillance of its Uighur population as an example. “You have China and Russia, where the rights of the state are considered far above the rights of the individuals within the state. The US sits somewhere in between. The US recognises human rights, but is quite state-centric in its outlook. So, the US is likely to be willing to do things that the UK and other Nato allies would not – and drone operations in Yemen would be an indicator of that kind of behaviour.”

Tough choices lie ahead for decision makers in the field of surveillance, with stealth concepts perhaps not providing the nirvana once envisaged. Even so, technology and politics will keep driving military planners worldwide to look for new and more advanced ways of keeping an eye on each other.